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Abstract:

We used the latest database of Chinese industrial enterprises to make an empirical test of the relationship
between the SO2 emissions trading pilot (ETP) policy implemented in 2007 and enterprise performance
based on a difference-in-difference (DID) method since the ETP policy tends to be a “quasi-natural
experiment.” The empirical results show that the ETP policy has a significant promotion effect on
enterprise performance, which provides evidence supporting the “Porter hypothesis” in China.
Heterogeneous regression results show that ETP policies play a vital role in promoting development
in heavily polluting industries, state-owned enterprises, and central regions. The test results of the
mechanism demonstrate that the ETP policy has two mechanisms to affect enterprise performance:
“improving the total factor productivity of the enterprise” and “increasing the extra cost of the
enterprise.” There are two policy implications of our research: first, government departments should
strive to explore and implement relevant market-based environmental regulations and policies; second,
government departments should vigorously support small and medium-sized enterprises and backward
areas in the west while focusing on heavily polluting industries and making the best use of environmental
regulations in pollution control, which are the key points for China to win the defense of the blue sky.
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Introduction

S

ince the first Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes
of the People’s Republic of China was enacted by China’s central government in 1987, the
Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan, known as the strictest air control plan in history,
was released in 2013. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China promulgated the Law
on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes of the People’s Republic
of China (Revised Edition) again in 2018, which reflects the central government’s determination
to control air pollution. The 2021 Government Work Report states that we should strengthen
pollution prevention and ecological construction, continue to improve environmental quality, indepth implementation of sustainable development strategies, consolidate the results of the blue sky,
blue water, clean soil defense war, and promote the green transformation of production and lifestyle.
All of these exemplified the fact that China’s central government has attached great importance to
protecting and improving the environment, advancing the construction of an ecological civilization,
and promoting sustainable economic and social development. As we all know, the development of
enterprises is inseparable from the consumption of natural resources. At the same time, it is inevitable
to produce pollution of “three industrial wastes,” namely wastewater, waste gas, and waste residue.
This naturally leads to a question: Can enterprise development coexist with environmental regulations
and policies that aim to protect an ecological civilization? The answer to this question is seriously
related to whether China’s economy can achieve sound and rapid development.
Regarding the relationship between environmental regulation policies and enterprise performance,
there are two main types of research literature in the academic field: the first type of literature supports
the “inhibition hypothesis” of neoclassical economics (Gray, 1987; Barbera et al., 1990; Gray et al.,
2003; Lanoie et al., 2008; Tu et al., 2015; Wang, 2017; Xie, 2017; Li et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019),
that is, the implementation of environmental regulations adds additional cost burdens to enterprises,
leading to a decline in enterprise performance. On the other hand, some literature supports Porter’s
“promoting hypothesis” view (Montgomery, 1972; Porter et al., 1995; Jaffe et al., 1997; Brannlund et al.,
1998; Hamamoto, 2006; Testa et al., 2011; Ambec et al., 2013; Rubashkina et al., 2015; Qi et al., 2018;
Ren et al., 2019; Borsatto et al., 2020; Zhang, 2020; Tao,2021). According to the “Porter hypothesis,”
appropriate environmental regulations can improve the efficiency of enterprise by stimulating
corporate innovation to offset or even exceed the additional environmental protection costs, thereby
improving enterprise performance. Based on a comprehensive review of the two types of literature, it
was difficult for us to judge the relationship between environmental regulation policies and enterprise
performance in theory, so we researched an answer from an empirical perspective.
In 2007, China implemented the largest SO2 emission trading pilot (ETP), an environmental
regulation policy in 11 provinces, which is equivalent to a rare “quasi-natural experiment” (Li et al.,
2016), which provided a valuable opportunity for us to test the relationship between environmental
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regulation and enterprise performance. The
following figure shows the impact of the ETP
policy on SO2 emissions in experimental areas
(11 provinces, represented by the Treated group)
and non-experimental areas (other provinces,
represented by the Control group). It is noticeable
that the average SO2 emission in the experimental
area is significantly higher than that in the
non-experimental area, which indicates the
accuracy of selecting regions; secondly, after the
implementation of the ETP policy in 2007, the Fig.1 The time trend of SO emission
Note: Data from the China Statistical Yearbook
average SO2 emissions of both the experimental
group and the non-experimental group have
been in a downward trend, and this downward trend began to appear in 2006, which may reflect the
expected effect of the ETP policy approaching implementation. Finally, it can be seen that the average
SO2 emissions remained stable in 2009 and 2010 and began to show an increase after 2010. One
possible reason may be the side effects of the central government’s response to the global economic
crisis by stimulating the economy.
Currently, there are three important articles closely related to the topic of ETP: the first one belongs
to Tu et al. (2015), who explored whether the ETP policy stimulates the “Porter Effect” in China. Their
empirical results show that although the emissions trading mechanism has alleviated the pollution
to a certain extent, there is a serious shortcoming in this article that cannot be ignored. In the article,
the year 2002 was used as the demarcation point of the experimental period. However, it was just in
the initial exploration period of the ETP policy, and the central government did not issue a relevant
standard policy system at that time, so the trading volume of emission rights in the pilot area was
basically zero in 2002 (Li et al., 2016; Ren et al., 2019). Thereby, the empirical results may reflect other
policy impacts (Such as the 2007 ETP policy) since its experimental period also includes 2007 to 2012;
Second, Qi et al. (2018) used the 2007 ETP policy as a quasi-natural experiment and listed company
data to confirm that emissions trading policies have significantly promoted corporate green innovation.
The main drawback of this article is that the sample database of listed companies is imperfect because
the database ignores many non-listed companies in the industry (annual observation value is 200,000 to
300,000) (Kong et al., 2013). Meanwhile, this article lacks a mechanism test for ETP policies promoting
corporate green innovation. In the last one, Ren et al. (2019) also used the 2007 SO2 emission trading
policy as a quasi-natural experiment and found that the emission trading system significantly improved
the total factor productivity of listed companies in the pilot area. However, this article also used an
imperfect database of listed companies. In addition, it is argued that the sample period should not
include 2015 because the ETP policy had by that time spread throughout the country.
Our paper fully draws on the merits of the above studies and has made some improvements.
2

39

CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL SCIENCES No.3. 2022

Specifically, we make the following contributions: First, the latest industrial enterprise data from
2003 to 2013 was used for the first time. Taking 2007 as the cut-off point of the ETP policy period,
we conducted a strict normative, empirical test on the ETP policy, which included not only the data
of listed companies, but also a large number of non-listed companies, which makes the data more
rigorous, comprehensive, and credible. Besides, we included return on assets (ROA) as an agent
variable of enterprise performance since it can be divided into “profit margin on sales” and “turnover
rate of total assets,” which is helpful when analyzing the real source of enterprise performance
improvement at a deeper level. Finally, we improved the robustness test conducted by Ren et al. (2019)
by using the random sampling method. It not only carries out random sampling for the experimental
group to capture the unobservable impact in different areas but also carries out random sampling for
the experimental period to capture the unobservable impact at different times.
The structure of this paper is as follows: The first part is a review of the mainstream literature on
the current research on environmental regulation and enterprise performance and a brief introduction
to China’s pilot policy on emissions trading. The second part is the research design, including sample
selection, variable measurement, and econometric model setting. The empirical analysis is the third
part, including basic regression analysis, robustness analysis, heterogeneity analysis, and mechanism
testing. The last is our conclusions and policy recommendations.

Literature Review and Policy Background
Literature Review
On the relationship between environmental regulation and enterprise performance, there is a large
debate in the academic community at present, and the views are quite the opposite. Some scholars
hold the view that environmental regulation hurts enterprise performance, which is a typical view of
neoclassical economics. Gray (1987), after research, believes that environmental regulation will add
additional burdens on production costs to enterprises and, therefore, will pose a depressing effect on
enterprise performance. Barbera et al. (1990) found that imperative environmental regulations also
have a suppressive effect on manufacturing productivity. Furthermore, Gray et al. (2003) pointed
out that under the requirements of environmental regulations, enterprises must conduct additional
R&D and technological innovations in energy conservation and emission reduction, which in turn,
have led to the “crowding-out effect” of productive investment in enterprises. Lanoie et al. (2008),
though analyzing data from Quebec, Canada, found that environmental regulation makes companies’
performance negative by increasing their extra costs. Tu et al. (2015) tried to explore whether the
pilot policy of SO2 emission trading in China stimulated the Porter effect. However, the empirical
results show that observing from both realistic and potential perspectives. The Porter effect has not
been verified in China, although to a certain extent, the problem of inefficient allocation of pollution
rights has been alleviated. Wang (2017) empirically tested the relationship between environmental
40
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regulations and the company’s total factor productivity using data from China’s industrial enterprises’
database and city-level data. The empirical results show that for every 1 percent increase in the
intensity of environmental regulation measured by the proportion of industrial pollution control
investment, the productivity of enterprises in the current period decreases by about 1 percent.
Li et al. (2019) studied the relationship between environmental regulation and green total factor
productivity of enterprises based on the Malmquist-Luenberger productivity index method and
found that environmental regulation will reduce the the green total factor productivity of enterprises
in the short term. Zhang et al. (2019) explored the impact of environmental regulation on the total
factor productivity of enterprises in the Yangtze River Economic Belt, and the results showed that
environmental regulation induced fluctuations in the total factor productivity of enterprises.
The opposite view is that environmental regulation can promote enterprise performance.
Montgomery (1972) proved theoretically that environmental regulation could effectively reduce the
cost of reducing pollution. Porter et al. (1995) proposed the famous “Porter hypothesis,” which predicts
that under certain conditions, environmental regulation can offset the cost of production brought by
environmental regulation through innovation incentives and improving the production efficiency of
enterprises so as to improve the performance of enterprises. Environmental regulation and enterprise
performance can coexist completely. Jaffe et al. (1997) believe that environmental regulation policy
can internalize the negative environmental externalities in the process of pollution discharge into
the production costs of enterprises and then force enterprises to carry out reform and technological
innovation, to achieve the improvement of performance. Besides, Brannlund et al. (1998) believed that
the trading mechanism of emission rights had realized the growth of corporate profits in the paper
industry in Sweden. Hamamoto (2006) studied the data of the Japanese manufacturing sector and
found that environmental regulations have improved the productivity of enterprises by improving
their R&D and innovation. Testa et al. (2011) also supported the view with empirical research of the
EU construction companies. Ambec et al. (2013) found that environmental regulation is consistent
with the growing trend of enterprise innovation. Li et al. (2013) found that the air pollution control
method played a significant role in promoting the total factor productivity of industrial enterprises by
using the DID method. Jefferson et al. (2013) studied the related policies of acid rain and SO2 emission
in 1998 and found that environmental regulatory policies promoted profits for enterprises in heavily
polluted areas of China. Qi et al. (2018) used data from listed companies with the SO2 emission
trading policy of 2007 as a quasi-natural experiment to confirm that the emission trading policy
significantly promoted corporate green innovation. Ren et al. (2019) also used the 2007 SO2 emission
trading policy as a quasi-natural experiment and found that the emission trading system significantly
improved the total factor productivity of listed companies in the pilot regions. Borsatto et al. (2020)
combed through 96 academic papers published in databases such as Web of Science over the last ten
years and found that most of the relevant literature identified environmental regulations as one of the
main factors that motivate firms to engage in green innovation. Zhang (2020) found that the stronger
the dynamic innovation capacity to a certain extent, the better the promotion of corporate financial
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performance, and the environmental regulation policy is significantly and positively related to the
firm’s performance; that is, the environmental regulation can significantly improve the financial
performance of the firm. Tao (2021) found that the environmental target responsibility system can
lead to an increase in the number of green innovations, and the establishment of an innovation
review system can maximize the quality of corporate innovation, stimulate a high level of corporate
innovation, and ultimately improve corporate performance.
In addition, some scholars have found that the relationship between the two is non-linear. For
example, Wang et al. (2014) empirically tested the impact of environmental regulation on the total
factor productivity of enterprises using data from Chinese industrial enterprises and found that
there is an inverse N-type relationship between environmental regulation and enterprise total factor
productivity. Xing (2020) analyzed the relationship between environmental regulation and enterprise
profitability in Guangdong province and found that the relationship between environmental regulation
and enterprise profitability is complicated by the dual effect of “innovation compensation” and
“compliance cost” on performance improvement, which is not a simple linear relationship, but an
inverted U-shaped relationship.
Policy Background
China’s extensive economic growth has created many environmental problems, so how to
effectively deal with environmental issues and achieve sustainable economic development is an urgent
challenge for China to tackle. The ETP policy of China was first implemented in the field of water
pollution. It was not until the mid-1990s that the former Ministry of Environmental Protection decided
to conduct pilots for air pollution trading in 6 cities, including Baotou and Guiyang (Li et al., 2016). In
2000, the central government began to explore market-based environmental regulations (Ren et al.,
2019). In March 2002, in order to explore the trading mechanism of SO2 pollution rights, the former
Ministry of Environmental Protection took the lead in four provinces; Shandong, Shanxi, Jiangsu,
and Henan, and three cities; Shanghai, Tianjin, and Liuzhou, and later joined the Huaneng Group to
launch the SO2 ETP policy, which was also called the “4 + 3 + 1” trading pilot policy. Since this policy
did not have a strictly regulated trading system nor an emission trading center or trading market, the
emission trading volume in many places after the implementation of the policy was zero (Li et al.,
2016; Ren et al., 2019), and the “Porter effect” was not detected (Tu et al., 2015; Qi et al., 2018).
In 2007, the central government officially launched the SO2 pollution rights trading policy.
The Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, the former Ministry of Environmental
Protection and the National Development and Reform Commission approved eleven provinciallevel regions as pilot areas: Jiangsu, Tianjin, Zhejiang, Hebei, Shanxi, Chongqing, Hubei, Shaanxi,
Inner Mongolia, Hunan, and Henan, involving multiple industries such as glass, chemical, mining,
and cement. The implementation of the emission trading policy was coordinated and realized under
the guidance of the central top-level design, local government supervision, and market mechanism.
During this period, the standardization process of emission rights was significantly accelerated
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(Li et al., 2016). At the same time, various regions formulated a series of relevant implementation
policies, resulting in an increase in the volume of emission trading year by year. Then in 2008,
the first municipal-level emission right reserve and trading center was established and listed in
Zhejiang province, and the corresponding offices and relevant supporting system measures were also
introduced one by one. Until 2014, the general office of the State Council issued guidance on further
promoting the pilot work of paid use and trading of emission rights, which marked the formal and
comprehensive spread of the SO2 pollution rights trading policy.

Empirical Design
Sample Selection
We selected the micro-data of manufacturing enterprises from 2003 to 2013 for our research,
with data mainly coming from the database of Chinese industrial enterprises. The specific selection
processes were as follows: Referring to the processing method of Cai & Liu (2009), the first step was to
eliminate missing observations of key indicators (such as government subsidies, total profit, income tax
expenses, number of employees, total industrial output value, sales income, etc.); the second step was
to eliminate observations that did not meet the “above-scale” standard, which means the total industrial
output value was less than RMB10 million. Sales were less than RMB10 million, or the number
of employees was less than 30; the third step was to exclude some observations that did not meet
accounting principles. In the end, we obtained sample data of manufacturing enterprises for a total of
nine years, from 2003 to 2013 (data missing in 2009 and 2010), covering 31 manufacturing double-digit
industries, which better reflected the overall situation of the entire manufacturing industry.
Variable Measurement
In related literature, there are many indicators for measuring enterprise performance. These
indicators usually include Tobin’s Q (Zhao et al., 2015), total ROA (Zhou et al., 2015), and return on net
assets (ROE) (Peng et al., 2015). We believe that Tobin’s Q method is only suitable for listed companies.
On the other hand, the database of Chinese industrial enterprises lacks some specific data needed
in this method. At the same time, considering the advantages of ROA that indicators can be further
decomposed, it will help us analyze the true source of enterprise performance improvement at a deeper
level. In contrast, ROE focuses more on the leverage of enterprises. To avoid a possible error in the
research results caused by the different emphasis on ROE, we finally decided to use the ROA as the
primary measure of enterprise performance.

According to the DuPont analysis formula, an enterprise’s ROA is composed of two parts, which are
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the profit margin on sales and the turnover rate of total assets. The product competitiveness and operation
efficiency of an enterprise can be properly displayed by the above two indicators. Meanwhile, on the
premise that the total assets of an enterprise remain relatively stable, the turnover rate of total assets can
also represent the expansion of the sales scale of an enterprise, which can help us to understand the Internal
influence approach of the ETP policy on enterprise performance from a deeper level. Therefore, in the
basic regression analysis, both indicators will be included in the measurement of enterprise performance.
In addition, to control the influence of financial subsidies on the net profit of enterprises, we deducted the
financial subsidies from the net profit in advance when calculating the above indicators by referring to
the practice of Zhao et al. (2015). According to Aghion et al. (2015) and Wang et al. (2014), “tax benefits”
is an important explanatory variable that affects enterprise performance. The tax benefits obtained by a
company are equal to “total profit * corporate income tax rate-the actual enterprise payable income tax.”
Regarding the establishment of the corporate income tax rate, we have sorted out the Detailed Rules for
Implementation of the Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign
Enterprises, “Notice on Tax Preferential Policies for the Development of the Western Regions,” and the
“Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China (Amended in 2018).” Among these and
other relevant tax policy documents, it was found that the setting principles are as follows: The income
tax rate of western development enterprises and high-tech enterprises is set at 15 percent; the income tax
rate of foreign-funded enterprises and enterprises in the special economic zone is set at 15 percent before
2008, and then gradually increased to 25 percent within five years according to the tax law setting rules.
Excluding other small corporate income tax rates that cannot be judged, the remaining corporate income
tax rates were uniformly set to 33 percent before 2008 and 25 percent after 2008, according to tax law
requirements. Although the intensity of fiscal subsidies and income tax preferences are not the focus
of this article. To control the impact of the two, we added two variables, lag periods for fiscal and tax
intensity. In addition to the above variables, we also referred to the control variables commonly used in
related research, such as corporate growth capacity, asset guarantee value, corporate age, main business
profitability, and main business growth rate (Hong et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2015; Liu,
2016), to control the regression equation. The setting method of all basic variables in this article is shown
in Table 3 below:
Table 1 Main variables and measurement
Variable

Meaning

Measurements

ROA

Enterprise performance

(Total profits-income tax-subsidies)/total assets

Treat

Dummy variable

In the pilot area, make it 1, or 0

Post

Dummy variable

Sub

Fiscal subsidies

Comp

Competition

Tax

Income tax preferences

After 2007, make it 1, or 0
Measurement 1: log (1+fiscal subsidies)
Measurement 2: fiscal subsidies/total assets
Measurement 1: 1- Herfindahl index of sales
Measurement 2: 1- Average industry profit margin
log (1+ Nominal tax-Actual tax)

NPR

Corporate growth capacity

(Net profit t-Net profit t-1)/Net profit t-1
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Variable

Meaning

Measurements

Tar

Asset guarantee value

(Stock+fixed assets)/total assets

Age

Corporate age

ln (2013-Establishment year +1)

Prof

Main business profitability

(Main business income-Main business cost)/Main business income

Growth

Main business growth rate

Main business income t-Main business income t-1)/Main business income t-1

Model Setting
To examine the impact of the ETP policy on enterprise performance, we refer to the practices of
Zhou et al. (2018), Zheng et al. (2018) and Ren et al. (2019) to construct the following two-way fixed
effect model:
(1)
In the equation above, the subscript t represents time, and i represents the enterprise. This
regression adopts clustering robust standard error, clustering to industry level. The coefficient of the
core explanatory variable Post * Treat in the equation was the focus of our attention, and Z was the
control variable, including the strength of financial subsidy (Sub), the strength of tax benefits (Tax),
the growth ability of the company (NPR), the asset guarantee value (Tar), the age of the company (Age),
the main business profit margin (Prof) and main business growth rate (Growth), The calculation of
specific variables is shown in table 1. In addition, ui represents the individual effect of the enterprise,
λt represents the fixed effect of time, and εit is the error term.

Empirical Analysis
Basic Regression Analysis
The results of basic regression analysis show that the ETP policy has a significant promotion
effect on enterprise performance, providing evidence for the “Porter hypothesis,” which means that
the promotion effect of the ETP policy on enterprise performance is greater than the inhibitory effect.
The following are the specific analysis: Column (1) is the regression result of ordinary ordinary
least square(OLS) without any control variables. We found that the emission trading policy Treat #
Post has no significant impact on enterprise performance after the reform, maybe because we did
not control the impact of other variables, leading to an inaccurate estimation; Then, in column (2),
when we introduce all the control variables without controlling overtime fixed effects and individual
fixed effects to capture the uncertain impact of a specific year and a specific individual, a significant
negative impact of Treat # Post on enterprise performance shows up; while in column (3), the timefixed and individual fixed effect are added to the control variables on the basis of column (2), that
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is, a two-way fixed-effect model is used to capture the uncertain impact of a specific year and
the individual enterprise’s heterogeneity difference respectively, then the result of Treat # Post is
significantly positive; Column (4) is based on the two-way fixed model with the robust standard error
clustering to the industry to capture the correlation and heteroscedasticity of individual error terms in
the industry. As a result, the coefficient of Treat # Post is 0.00666, and it is significantly positive at the
level of 5 percent, which fully indicates that emissions trading policies have a significant promotion
effect on enterprise performance. To further investigate the internal source of enterprise performance
change, we decomposed enterprise performance into sales profit rate and total asset turnover rate, and
then regress them respectively. The results are shown in columns (5) and (6). It is obvious that Treat
# Post has a significant promoting effect on sales profit rate with a coefficient of 0.00304, which is
significant at the level of 1 percent, but has no significant effect on the total asset turnover rate. This
shows that the improvement of enterprise performance is more from the growth of the sales profit rate.
Table 2 Baseline results
(1)
VARIABLES

ROA

ROA

ROA

ROA

Sales profit rate

Treat#Post

0.113

-0.0118***

0.00666***

0.00666**

0.00304***

(6)
Total asset
turnover rate
-0.705

(0.108)

(0.00193)

(0.00192)

(0.00317)

(0.000570)

(0.685)

-0.126

0.0202***

0.000936

0.000936

-0.00421***

0.674

(0.0810)

(0.00150)

(0.00387)

(0.00678)

(0.000796)

(0.594)

-0.0757

0.0395***

0.0795***

0.0668***

-0.00490***

1.347***

(0.0651)

(0.00134)

(0.00244)

(0.00688)

(0.00129)

(0.363)

0.254***

0.138***

0.0449***

0.0449***

0.0285***

3.536***

Treat
Post
Constant

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(0.0512)

(0.00961)

(0.0171)

(0.0118)

(0.00431)

(1.133)

Controls

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year FE

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Firm FE

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Clustered

N

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Observations

959,677

440,675

440,675

440,675

440,675

440,675

R-squared

0.000

0.119

0.077

0.077

0.235

0.000

Note: *, ** and *** represents the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at the industry level.

Parallel Trend and Dynamic Effect Test
Consistency of double-difference or multiple-difference estimators requires the assumption of
parallel trends (Fu et al., 2015). As we all know, the premise of using the DID method is that the
experimental group and the non-experimental group must meet the parallel trend hypothesis. On
the assumption of a parallel trend, many scholars use the drawing observation method to identify it,
which is intuitive but not rigorous. In this part, with reference to the practices of Kong et al. (2015),
Zheng et al. (2018), Ren et al. (2019), the “event study approach” was used to test the balance trend.
46
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This method is different from the DID method, which can only identify the average effect before
and after the ETP policy period and can also observe the dynamic effect brought by the ETP policy
in each year. Assuming the ETP policy reform takes place in each year of the sample period, the
following measurement equation was constructed:
(2)
The meaning here is different from equation (1). Specifically, when t = 2003, Post2003 = 1, and
other years are replaced by 0, then every year, the situation is analogous in this way. Representing
the effect of the ETP policy every year is the coefficient we care about, with the explanation of other
variables unchanged. The regression results are shown in Table 3 below. No significant differences in
enterprise performance are shown in 2004, 2005, and 2006. This means that there was no significant
difference between the experimental group and the non-experimental group before the ETP
policy reform, which indicates that this empirical analysis meets the assumption of parallel trends.
Meanwhile, the ETP policy has significantly promoted enterprise performance since 2007. Then the
promotion effect weakened in 2008 and disappeared in 2011, indicating that although the emission
trading policy has a significant impact on enterprise performance, the impact decreases with time.
Table 3 Dynamic results
Year 2004

Year 2005

Year 2006

Year 2007

Year 2008

Year 2013

Coefficient

0.00173

-0.000191

0.00176

0.00741**

0.00947***

0.00602**

Standard error

(0.00334)

(0.00347)

(0.00349)

(0.00324)

(0.00314)

(0.00218)

Note: *, ** and *** represents the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The standard errors are reported
in parentheses and clustered at the industry level. Because of collinearity and missing values, the coefficients of the
year 2003, 2011, and 2012 are missing. The database of manufacturing enterprises does not include the year 2008
and 2009, then we also do not report the results.

Figure 2 shows the dynamic change of
βt and its 90 percent confidence interval.
From the figure, it is noticeable that the
dynamic regression coefficient was not
significantly different from 0 in 2006 and
before at 90 percent confidence interval,
while the data were significantly different
from zero in 2007 and 2008 until the
policy effect disappeared in 2013.
Robustness Analysis
Placebo Test (a): Referring to the
random sampling method used by Zhou

Fig.2 The dynamic effect of the ETP policy on enterprise performance
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et al. (2018) and Ren et al. (2019), our procedure further improves this method and then uses it for
a placebo test. Specifically, to start with, 200 random samples were taken from 31 provincial-level
administrative units in China. 11 provinces were randomly selected as the experimental group
and the remaining 20 provinces as the non-experimental group. The biggest advantage of this is
that it cannot only control the observable influencing factors but also capture some influencing
factors that are difficult to observe with the change of the region, “such as other industrial policy
adjustments of local governments in different regions”(Zhou et al., 2018). Second, the reference
method only randomly samples the experimental group, and based on this, 200 random samplings
were simultaneously performed for the policy period in this article. Specifically, the first and last two
years of the sample period were eliminated, and then a year was randomly selected from 2004 to
2012 as the implementation year of the policy. This year and the following years were designated as
the experimental period, and the former as the non-experimental period. The main advantage of this
method is that it can eliminate the unobservable shocks that occur in the period, such as the “4 + 3
+ 1” ETP policy started from 2002 while superimposed in the same period, and the pollution charge
collection policy issued by the State Council in 2003. Third, after 200 random samplings, we could
get 200 experimental periods and experimental groups, and then substitute them into equation (1) for
regression, respectively, getting 200 regression coefficients and T values of Treat#Post. The last step
was to draw the kernel density plots of coefficients and t
values, as shown in Figures 3 and 4.
It is obvious from Figure 4 that most of the coefficients
are distributed around the value of 0, which indicates that
the impact of the ETP policy is small. Similarly, in Figure
5 the t value is also mainly distributed around the value
of 0, which indicates that the impact of the ETP policy
is basically not significant. Combining the results of the
two graphs, the impact of ETP policies on enterprise
performance is unlikely to be driven by the impact of
Fig.3 the density of coefficients
unobservable shocks in different regions and years.
Placebo Test (b): Referring to the practice of Lu &
Yu (2015), we took the sample period from 2003 to 2006
before the ETP policy actually occurred, and assumed that
the ETP policy occurred in 2004 and 2005, respectively.
Then in 2004 (2005) and after, the POST value is 1,
otherwise it is 0. The target coefficients we expected were
not significant. Otherwise, there may have been other
unobservable factors affecting the previous results. The test
results are shown in Table 4. Column (1) is the regression
result of assuming policy reform occurred in 2004.
Fig.4 the density of t values
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Obviously, the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant, indicating that the ETP policy had
no impact on enterprise performance. Meanwhile, column (2) assumes that the policy reform that
occurred in 2005 shows the same result. Taking the two results together, it is confirmed there was no
significant difference between the treatment group and the experimental group before the ETP policy
reform was actually implemented, which also supports the parallel trend assumption of the two from
another aspect.
Replace Explanatory Variables: For “industry competition variable,” “industry average profit rate”
takes the place as a different measurement method; the results are shown in column (3) of Table 4.
The average impact of the ETP policy on corporate performance is 0.00665, significant at the level
of 5 percent, indicating that the ETP policy still has a significant impact on enterprise performance,
and the results remain robust. Similarly, using the second algorithm of “financial subsidy intensity”
by “subsidy amount / total assets,” we found the coefficient was 0.0067, significant at 5 percent.
Consistent results suggest that the conclusions are robust. Limited by the length of this article, results
are not reported here.
Using D-K Standard Error: Clustering standard error is used in the article, only considering
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems of the error term. The error term of the measurement
equation may have three major problems of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and cross-section
correlation, leading to invalid results. To solve this problem, we used the Driscoll-Kraay (DK)
standard error to test, since the DK standard error can deal with the three major problems described
above at the same time. The regression results are shown in column (4). With significant results at
the level of 1 percent, the ETP policy still has a significant and robust effect on promoting corporate
performance.
Using Instrumental Variables: Considering that industry competition Comp1 and corporate
performance ROA may have a two-way causal relationship because high-performance companies
have stronger market competitiveness, which in turn can further intensify market competition,
which could lead to the invalidation of the estimation results of our analysis, we dealt with possible
endogenous problems in Comp1 by using the lagging phase 1 and lagging phase 2 of Comp1 as the
instrumental variables for regression. Meanwhile, considering the possible heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation of the error term, we further used the Gaussian Mixed Model (GMM) instrumental
variable method for regression. The β1 is 0.0104, shown in column (5), significantly positive at the
level of 5 percent, which indicates that the results remain robust after considering endogenous issues.
In addition, three major tests on the validity of the instrumental variables were performed: the test
results rejected the unidentifiable test null hypothesis (KP statistic is 1795.264), indicating that the
instrumental variables meet the rank condition; the test results rejected the weakly recognized test
null hypothesis (F statistics is 2411.412), indicating that the instrumental variables have a strong
correlation; the test results were also subjected to an over-identification test (Hasen’s statistic is 0.164),
indicating that the instrumental variables are all exogenous. The above three tests fully show that the
instrumental variables selected for our analysis were effective.
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Time Trend Effect: Under normal circumstances, there is a tendency for enterprise performance
to change over time, which could easily confuse our estimates. To capture the possible trend effect
of time, based on the measurement equation (1), we introduced the time trend term to capture the
time effect, with results shown in column (6). The β1 is 0.00666, significantly positive at the level
of 5 percent, indicating that the ETP policy still has a significant and robust impact on enterprise
performance. In addition, we also introduced the “Provincial Time Trend” and “Industry Time Trend”
to capture the province fixed effects and industry fixed effects that change with time trends. The
results remained stable but are not reported here because of the limited length of the article.
Table 4 Robustness results
(1)
VARIABLES

ROA

Treat#Post2004

0.0727

(2)
ROA

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

ROA

ROA

ROA

ROA

0.00665**

0.00666***

0.0104**

0.00666**

(0.0460)
Treat#Post2005

0.000299
(0.00216)

Treat#Post

(0.00317)

(0.00232)

(0.00455)

(0.00317)

-0.0215

-0.0214

0.0390

0

0

0.0272**

(0.0576)

(0.0578)

(0.0582)

(0)

(0)

(0.0121)

Controls

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Firm FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Clustered

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Observations

168,877

168,877

440,675

440,675

102467

440,675

R-squared

0.062

0.062

0.076

0.077

0.0729

211,854

Constant

Note: *, ** and *** represents the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at the industry level.

Heterogeneity Analysis
The heterogeneity of the impact from three different perspectives: industry pollution attributes,
ownership attributes, and regional attributes are discussed in this section. Referring to the practice of
Fan et al. (2019), the measurement equation was set as follows:
(3)
When the industry belongs to a heavy pollution industry, it was assigned as 1, otherwise 0; when
the ownership is a state-owned enterprise, it was assigned as 1, otherwise 0; when the region is in the
East, it was assigned as 3; when the region is in the middle, it was assigned as 2; when the region is in
the west, it is assigned as 1. Among them, the interaction term Postt * Treati * M is the core variable
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we care about. The essence of this method is the Chow test, which is more standard and accurate than
group regression. The specific regression results are shown in Table 5 below:
Column (1) is the regression result of the pollution heterogeneity of the industry. It is not difficult
to find that the coefficient of the interaction term is 0.0108, significant at the level of 10 percent, which
shows that compared with the industries with light pollution, the ETP policy has a stronger effect
on promoting corporate performance in heavily polluting industries. The regression results are also
consistent with our intuition since additional environmental costs force highly polluting enterprises to
carry out green innovation, which has improved production efficiency and performance. Therefore,
we can also conclude that the significant promotion effect of ETP policies on enterprise performance
mainly come from heavily polluting industries.
Column (2) is the regression result of enterprise ownership heterogeneity. The interaction term
coefficient is 0.00902, significant at the level of 5 percent, which shows that compared to non-stateowned enterprises, the emission trading policy has a greater effect on the performance of enterprises
directly controlled by the state. One of the possible explanations is that these enterprises will respond
more actively to the ETP policy reforms. At the same time, due to the strong financial resources of
state-owned enterprises, they can invest a large number of funds for R&D and innovation in a short
period of time, so the effect of policies on state-owned enterprises is more significant.
Column (3) shows the result of regression by different regions. It is not difficult to find that as
the region advances from the west to the east, the inhibitory effect of the ETP policy on enterprise
performance becomes stronger. The analysis was based on the assumption that there is a linear
relationship between the ETP policy and regional heterogeneity, which may be unreasonable.
Therefore, to further test the average impact of policy reforms on each region, we also conducted a
sub-sample regression of the eastern, central, and western regions. The results show that emissions
trading policies have a significant promotion effect on the central region and a significant inhibitory
effect on the western and eastern regions. This result is considered to be in line with reality because
the pilot areas of the ETP policy reform are mainly concentrated in the central and eastern regions,
while the eastern region is located in a coastal zone with a relatively developed economy and relatively
intensive production. Because polluting companies have gradually migrated to the central and western
regions, the ETP policy has limited incentives in the eastern region, and additional environmental
protection costs may not be conducive to the performance improvement of the enterprises in the
eastern region. On the other hand, the western region is lacking in funds and technology, which
leads to difficulty in offsetting the environmental protection costs created by the ETP policy through
technological innovation, resulting in easily causing a decline in performance. In contrast, the central
region has more technological and financial advantages. By increasing the investment in research and
development of new technology, these enterprises can effectively improve the production mode and
enhance the efficiency of enterprises to offset the additional environmental costs, and then promote
the improvement of enterprise performance. At last, we can conclude that from the perspective
of regional heterogeneity, enterprises in the central regions play a leading role in promoting the
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performance of enterprises.
Table 5 Heterogeneous results

VARIABLES

ROA

Treat#Post#pollution

0.0108*
(0.00575)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Pollution

Ownership

Region

ROA

0.00902**
(0.00372)

Treat#Post#soe
Treat#Post#region
Constant

ROA

0.0436***
(0.0122)

0.0454***
(0.0125)

-0.0242***
(0.00566)
0.0375**
(0.0175)

Controls

Y

Y

Y

Year FE

Y

Y

Y

Firm FE

Y

Y

Y

Clustered

Y

Y

Y

Observations

440,675

440,675

403,905

R-squared

0.077

0.077

0.079

Note: *, ** and *** represents the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at the industry level.

Mechanism Analysis
According to the previous review, there are two main internal mechanisms of the effect of
ETP policies on corporate performance: the first is the productivity mechanism. The ETP policy
urged companies to increase research and development efforts to improve corporate productivity,
thereby making up for the additional environmental protection costs that the companies have
added. Eventually, these actions led to the promotion of corporate performance. The second is the
pollution cost mechanism. The implementation of the ETP policy has caused enterprises to increase
their pollution costs, forcing them to transfer some resources to pollution control, which in turn has
reduced their performance. Regarding the second mechanism, there is no relevant pollution data in
the database of Chinese industrial enterprises, and the existing data cannot be used for measurement.
So, referring to the practice of Fang et al. (2013), we only tested the first mechanism to disprove the
second mechanism.
For the measurement of corporate productivity, mainstream literature tends to use TFP (Wang
et al., 2014; Ren et al., 2019). However, TFP has two algorithms: the OP method and the LP method.
The OP method can better deal with the problem of simultaneity deviation and selectivity deviation
by using the current investment of the company as the proxy variable of unobservable productivity,
but it can also cause the loss of many samples, while the LP method can better solve the problem of
missing samples by using intermediate input instead of investment. To ensure robust results, we used
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both the OP and LP methods to measure corporate productivity. For the selection of the mechanism
test method, we used the “sequential test method” or “casual steps” proposed by Baron & Kenny (1986)
in three steps.
The specific results are shown in Table 6: Column (1) is the basic regression result with a
significant promotion effect on enterprise performance, same as above. Column (2) is the regression
result of the TFP calculated by the OP method as the explanatory variable. It can be seen that
the coefficient of the ETP policy is 0.0155, significant at the level of 10 percent, which indicates
that the ETP policy has a significant promotion effect on the enterprise’s total factor productivity.
Column (3) is the regression result of the TFP calculated by the OP method, in which the coefficient
is 0.0554, significant at the level of 1 percent. Combined with the results of column (2), the
productivity mechanism is fully confirmed. Further observe that the coefficient of Treat # Post is
0.0095, significant at the level of 5 percent, which is only slightly improved compared to column (1),
indicating that the productivity mechanism is a mechanism of the ETP policy affecting corporate
performance, rather than the main mechanism, which means that there are other mechanism effects,
so the second pollution cost mechanism mentioned above is confirmed. The regression results
obtained by calculating the TFP using the LP method shown in columns (4) and (5) are very robust.
Table 6 Mechanism results
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

VARIABLES

ROA

OP_TFP

ROA

LP_TFP

ROA

Treat#Post

0.00666**

0.0155*

0.00950**

0.0167*

0.00959**

(0.00317)

(0.00830)

(0.00381)
0.0554***
(0.00312)

(0.00887)

(0.00383)

OP_TFP

Controls

0.0449***
(0.0118)
Y

2.176***
(0.130)
Y

-0.168***
(0.0439)
Y

2.315***
(0.141)
Y

0.0468***
(0.00266)
-0.159***
(0.0435)
Y

Year FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Firm FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Clustered

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Observations

440,675

261,671

255,987

261,671

255,987

R-squared

0.077

0.109

0.083

0.145

0.078

LP_TFP
Constant

Note: *, ** and *** represents the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at the industry level.

Conclusions and Policy Implication
Based on the existing related literature research, we used the latest database of Chinese industrial
enterprises from 2003 to 2013 and the two-way fixed-effect regression model based on the DID
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method to conduct a strict and standardized empirical test on the relationship between the SO2 ETP
policy and corporate performance with the help of the “quasi-natural experiment” in 2007. The results
of the basic regression and robustness tests show that the ETP policy has a significant promotion effect
on corporate performance, providing Chinese evidence for the “Porter hypothesis.” Heterogeneous
regression results show that the SO2 ETP policy has a more significant promotion effect in heavily
polluting industries, state-owned enterprises, and central regions, while in lightly polluting industries,
non-state-owned enterprises, and eastern and western regions, there is no significant or even negative
impact. The results of the mechanism test show that the ETP policy promotes the improvement of
corporate performance through the mechanism of “increasing the total factor productivity of the
enterprise,” and also implies the existence of a reverse mechanism of “increasing the additional
environmental protection costs of the enterprise.”
The policy implications of this article focus on two points. First, given that the SO2 ETP policy
conforms with the “Porter hypothesis,” central and local government departments of China should
strive to explore and implement relevant market-based environmental regulatory policies, so that the
market can give full play to the role of resource allocation, promoting corporate R&D innovation
capabilities and awareness of energy conservation and emission reduction, to achieve better, faster,
and higher-quality economic development. Second, government departments should improve relevant
policy supporting measures and market supervision to support enterprises at different levels. For small
and medium-sized enterprises and backward areas in the west, we must vigorously support them to
promote their R&D and innovation to improve production efficiency. For heavily polluting industries,
which are in the worst-hit areas of sewage, we must focus on strengthening supervision and ensuring
strict implementation of environmental regulations and policies. At the same time, we can also make
use of incentives to achieve a reborn industry as soon as possible, which is the key point to China’s
victory in defense of the blue sky.
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